Preserve symlinks and old-snapshot immutability (#9)
* Preserve symlinks and old-snapshot immutability Two real bugs found while implementing this item, both in fs.py: - copy_direntry() checked entry.is_dir() (default follow_symlinks=True) before entry.is_symlink(). A symlink pointing at a directory was misclassified as a directory and an empty real directory was created in its place, silently destroying the symlink and losing its target entirely. Fixed by checking is_symlink() first, and is_dir() with follow_symlinks=False. - rsync()'s permission/ownership-sync branch called os.chmod/os.chown on dst_entry.path unconditionally. Two problems: (1) for a symlink whose target already matched, this had no follow_symlinks=False guard and could rewrite an external symlink target's permissions; (2) for a regular file, that path may still be hardlinked to the same file in the previous, completed snapshot (hardlink_dir() links unchanged files in at the start of every backup) - mutating it in place silently corrupted every older snapshot sharing the inode. Fixed by skipping symlinks entirely (nothing to sync once their target matches) and adding _break_shared_hardlink(), a copy-on-write step that gives a file its own inode before any in-place metadata change. Also fixed the dir-mtime-restore loop's is_dir() call (same default-follow_symlinks issue, lower severity since its own operations were already lstat-based/no-follow). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Address Copilot review: preserve ownership/timestamps when breaking hardlinks, fix test fd leak - _break_shared_hardlink() now explicitly restores the original file's uid/gid and atime/mtime on the new private copy before it replaces the shared one. copy_file() only carries over mode at create time, so without this a caller that only meant to update permissions would silently also reset ownership/mtime as a side effect of the copy-on-write break itself. Also cleans up the temp file on failure and uses a less collision-prone temp name. - Fixed a file descriptor leak in the new hardlink-immutability test (bare open(...).read() without a context manager) - Strengthened the same test to assert mtime survives the break Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Maxim Shulga <maxim.shulga@alludo.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -285,6 +285,32 @@ class TestCopyDirEntry:
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dst_stat = os.lstat(dst_path)
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assert dst_stat.st_mode == src_stat.st_mode
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def test_copy_symlink_to_directory_stays_a_symlink(self, tmp_path):
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"""
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Regression: is_dir()/is_file() default to follow_symlinks=True,
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so a symlink pointing at a directory must be classified via
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is_symlink() first, or it gets misclassified as a directory and
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an empty real directory is created in its place - silently
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destroying the symlink and losing its target entirely.
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"""
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target_dir = os.path.join(str(tmp_path), "target_dir")
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src_link = os.path.join(str(tmp_path), "source_link")
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dst_link = os.path.join(str(tmp_path), "dest_link")
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os.mkdir(target_dir)
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with open(os.path.join(target_dir, "canary"), "w") as f:
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f.write("content")
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os.symlink(target_dir, src_link)
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with os.scandir(str(tmp_path)) as it:
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for entry in it:
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if entry.name == "source_link":
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fs.copy_direntry(entry, dst_link)
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break
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assert os.path.islink(dst_link)
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assert os.readlink(dst_link) == target_dir
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def test_copy_symlink_preserves_times_if_supported(self, tmp_path):
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"""Test that symlink timestamps are preserved (OS-dependent)"""
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target_path = os.path.join(str(tmp_path), "target.txt")
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@@ -635,3 +635,77 @@ class TestRsyncExt:
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assert results[2][0] == "config.json"
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assert results[3][0] == "existing.txt"
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assert results[4][0] == "old/"
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class TestRsyncHardlinkImmutability:
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"""
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Regression tests: rsync() is run against a staging directory that
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was populated by hardlinking in the previous, completed snapshot
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(curateipsum.backup.hardlink_dir). Any in-place metadata change made
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while updating staging must never mutate that previous snapshot's
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files via the shared inode.
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"""
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def test_permission_change_does_not_mutate_shared_hardlink(
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self, common_fs_dirs, tmp_path
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):
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src_dir, dst_dir = common_fs_dirs
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# Independent source file with new content/mtime but the SAME
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# eventual permissions the old snapshot file already has - only
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# the fallback "update permissions and ownership" branch should
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# fire, not a full rewrite (which would already be safe via
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# rm+recreate).
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src_fpath = create_file(str(src_dir))
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os.chmod(src_fpath, 0o600)
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# Simulate staging (dst_dir) having been hardlinked in from the
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# previous, completed snapshot: a separate directory tree outside
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# dst_dir, sharing an inode with the staging file, with content
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# and mtime matching src (so only permissions differ) but the old
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# mode.
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dst_fpath = os.path.join(str(dst_dir),
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relpath(src_fpath, str(src_dir), str(dst_dir)))
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prior_snapshot_fpath = str(tmp_path / "prior_snapshot")
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with open(src_fpath) as src_f:
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src_content = src_f.read()
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with open(prior_snapshot_fpath, "w") as f:
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f.write(src_content)
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os.chmod(prior_snapshot_fpath, 0o644)
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src_stat = os.lstat(src_fpath)
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os.utime(prior_snapshot_fpath, (src_stat.st_atime, src_stat.st_mtime))
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os.link(prior_snapshot_fpath, dst_fpath)
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prior_mode_before = os.lstat(prior_snapshot_fpath).st_mode
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dst_mtime_before = os.lstat(dst_fpath).st_mtime
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assert os.lstat(dst_fpath).st_ino == os.lstat(
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prior_snapshot_fpath).st_ino # sanity: genuinely shared
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all(fs.rsync(str(src_dir), str(dst_dir)))
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assert os.lstat(dst_fpath).st_mode == os.lstat(src_fpath).st_mode
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assert os.lstat(prior_snapshot_fpath).st_mode == prior_mode_before
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# dst must now have its own inode, no longer shared
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assert os.lstat(dst_fpath).st_ino != os.lstat(
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prior_snapshot_fpath).st_ino
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# breaking the hardlink must not, as a side effect, reset mtime:
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# rsync only intended to change permissions here (content/mtime
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# already matched), and uid/gid are identical for this test user
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# so the chown branch never fires to "accidentally" fix ownership
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assert os.lstat(dst_fpath).st_mtime == dst_mtime_before
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def test_symlink_metadata_never_touches_external_target(
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self, common_fs_dirs, tmp_path
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):
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src_dir, dst_dir = common_fs_dirs
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external_target = tmp_path / "external_target"
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external_target.mkdir()
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(external_target / "canary").write_text("do-not-touch")
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external_mode_before = os.lstat(str(external_target)).st_mode
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link_name = "a_symlink"
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os.symlink(str(external_target), os.path.join(str(src_dir), link_name))
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os.symlink(str(external_target), os.path.join(str(dst_dir), link_name))
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all(fs.rsync(str(src_dir), str(dst_dir)))
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assert os.lstat(str(external_target)).st_mode == external_mode_before
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assert (external_target / "canary").read_text() == "do-not-touch"
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