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docker-seafile-client/IMPROVEMENTS.md
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Maxim Shulga 6abd3323d2 Reconcile the improvement plan with the AppImage change
The signature acceptance criterion assumed the signed APT repository.
Upstream ships a bare AppImage with no digest or signature, so as written
it could never be met and would block the release gate indefinitely.
State what the build actually enforces, and track the weakened supply
chain as its own item rather than only a note.
2026-08-02 16:07:18 -07:00

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Markdown

# Improvement Plan
This plan prioritizes user safety and a working release pipeline before public
portfolio polish. The project already has useful adoption evidence: more than
5,800 Docker Hub pulls, external issues, and external contributions.
Security-sensitive findings should be fixed and released before detailed
exploit scenarios are discussed in public issues.
## P0 - Release blockers
### Restore reproducible image builds
- [x] Replace the unavailable Seafile APT repository used in `Dockerfile`.
Upstream discontinued it; the CLI now ships as an x86_64-only AppImage.
- [x] Install a supported Seafile CLI version from an official source.
- [x] Pin the version and verify its checksum during the build. The checksum is
trust-on-first-use: upstream publishes no digest or signature alongside the
AppImage, so this is weaker than the signed APT repository it replaces.
- [x] Remove `apt-key`, which is deprecated and trusts keys globally.
- [x] Add a smoke check that `seaf-cli` runs to the image build. Note that
`seaf-cli` has no `--version` flag; use `seaf-cli --help` and assert the
expected subcommands, and record the installed version from the package
manager instead.
- [ ] Scan the resulting image and review every high or critical finding.
- [ ] Establish a stronger trust anchor for the AppImage than a self-derived
checksum: an upstream digest or signature, or a verified artifact mirrored
somewhere we control.
Acceptance criteria:
- A clean `docker build --no-cache .` succeeds in CI.
- The installed Seafile version is explicit and current.
- An invalid artifact checksum fails the build. Upstream publishes no signature
for the AppImage, so signature verification is not achievable from this
source.
### Remove shell and path injection risks
- [ ] Pass subprocess arguments as arrays instead of joining values into shell
command strings in `dsc/client.py` and `dsc/misc.py`.
- [ ] Replace `su -c` with a mechanism such as `runuser --` that does not need a
shell.
- [ ] Treat server-provided library names as untrusted input.
- [ ] Resolve every target directory and prove that it remains under
`/dsc/seafile` before creating or writing it.
- [ ] Define how duplicate, absolute, empty, and traversal-style library names
are handled.
Acceptance criteria:
- Tests cover quotes, command substitutions, separators, newlines, absolute
paths, parent traversal, Unicode, and colliding library names.
- No configuration or server value can execute a command or escape the data
directory.
### Support secrets safely
- [ ] Implement `PASSWORD_FILE` for Docker Compose and Swarm secrets.
- [ ] Add token-based authentication and `TOKEN_FILE` if supported by the
installed Seafile CLI.
- [ ] Define precedence and reject conflicting secret sources.
- [ ] Ensure secrets are absent from application logs.
- [ ] Document any upstream limitation that exposes a secret in process
arguments.
Acceptance criteria:
- A container can authenticate with a mounted file under `/run/secrets`.
- Tests reject conflicting inputs and verify newline handling.
- Logs never contain the password or token.
### Correct environment parsing and defaults
- [ ] Replace direct `os.getenv()` assignments in `start.py` with typed parsers.
- [ ] Preserve the documented defaults for upload limit, download limit, and
delete-confirm threshold when variables are absent.
- [ ] Validate UID, GID, limits, threshold, and booleans before daemon startup.
- [ ] Reject negative and malformed numeric values with useful messages.
- [ ] Do not pass `None` as a Seafile configuration value.
Acceptance criteria:
- Table-driven tests cover unset, zero, valid, negative, and malformed values.
- A default container receives exactly the defaults documented in the README.
### Make startup and shutdown deterministic
- [ ] Check every important subprocess return code.
- [ ] Add timeouts to daemon startup, shutdown, and readiness polling.
- [ ] Handle `SIGTERM` and `SIGINT` and stop the daemon in `finally`.
- [ ] Return a nonzero container exit code on configuration or daemon failure.
- [ ] Produce actionable errors instead of waiting forever.
Acceptance criteria:
- A daemon that never becomes ready causes a bounded failure.
- `docker stop` performs a graceful shutdown within Docker's timeout.
- Failure-injection tests cover command errors and interrupted startup.
### Add real tests
- [ ] Add unit tests for configuration parsing, command construction, library
resolution, path validation, retries, and status parsing.
- [ ] Add regression tests for externally reported password and deletion
threshold issues.
- [ ] Add a container smoke test for imports, installed CLI version, startup,
and shutdown using controlled fakes.
- [ ] Keep image construction as a separate CI job so packaging failures are
distinguishable from application failures.
Acceptance criteria:
- CI fails on a deliberate parsing, quoting, or path-safety regression.
- Application tests run without requiring a live production server.
### Repair and validate the quick start
- [x] Change the Compose example to mapping syntax so quote characters are not
passed as part of `LIBRARY_ID`.
- [x] Pin the example to a versioned image instead of an implicit latest tag.
- [x] Add a checked-in `compose.example.yaml`.
- [x] Validate it with `docker compose config` in CI.
## P1 - Reliability and supply chain
### Networking and protocol behavior
- [ ] Add explicit connect and read timeouts to all HTTP requests.
- [ ] Define a bounded retry budget with backoff and jitter.
- [ ] Handle authentication, rate limits, malformed responses, and retryable
server errors separately.
- [ ] Make TLS configuration consistent between Python requests and Seafile.
- [ ] Support a custom CA bundle; keep certificate disabling as a last resort.
- [ ] Prefer structured JSON output from `seaf-cli` over parsing display text.
- [ ] Reject ambiguous library names and an empty requested library set.
### Runtime hardening
- [ ] Run the long-lived process as the configured non-root user after setup.
- [ ] Reject UID or GID zero unless a documented use case requires it.
- [ ] Add a health check for the daemon and RPC endpoint.
- [ ] Handle temporary RPC failures and daemon restarts without corrupting
state.
- [ ] Document supported CPU architectures instead of implying multi-platform
support.
### CI and release pipeline
- [ ] Replace `actions/checkout@v2` and `docker/build-push-action@v1`.
- [ ] Set workflow permissions explicitly to `contents: read` by default.
- [ ] Use a scoped Docker Hub access token.
- [ ] Build a release image once and attach all version and `latest` tags to
the same manifest digest.
- [ ] Add OCI labels, an SBOM, provenance, and image signing.
- [ ] Add dependency updates for Python, Docker, and GitHub Actions.
- [ ] Run dependency and image scans on pull requests and on a schedule.
Acceptance criteria:
- Every tag for one release resolves to the same manifest digest.
- Pull requests cannot access publication credentials.
- The current dependency update pull request passes all checks.
## P2 - Maintainability and presentation
### Simplify the implementation
- [ ] Separate configuration, subprocess execution, library resolution, and
status monitoring so each can be tested independently.
- [ ] Remove unused imports and unnecessary dependencies.
- [ ] Add type annotations and static checks at external-input boundaries.
- [ ] Make logging configurable and avoid forced dependency debug logs.
- [ ] Add `.dockerignore` and reduce unnecessary image packages.
### Establish a visible maintenance process
- [ ] Publish GitHub Releases for future tags with compatibility and rollback
notes.
- [ ] Add `CHANGELOG.md`, `SECURITY.md`, and concise contribution guidance.
- [ ] Add issue templates that request image, client, and server versions plus
sanitized logs.
- [ ] Triage stale issues and document the status of Docker secret support.
- [ ] Enable branch protection and require passing CI before merge.
### Improve the public project page
- [x] Link directly to the Docker Hub image near the top of `README.md`.
- [ ] Add CI, release, Docker pulls, and license badges after the checks are
trustworthy.
- [ ] Add a short architecture and process-lifecycle section.
- [ ] Add a tested compatibility matrix.
- [ ] Explain deletion behavior, volume ownership, state loss, backup
expectations, and recovery.
- [ ] Fix example inconsistencies and typographical errors.
## Release gate
Do not publish the next image until all of the following are true:
- [ ] A clean, reproducible build uses a supported Seafile client.
- [ ] External values cannot reach a shell or escape the data directory.
- [ ] Secret-file or token authentication is covered by tests.
- [ ] Startup, retries, and shutdown are bounded and observable.
- [ ] Unit and container smoke tests pass.
- [ ] The steady-state process is non-root and has a useful health check.
- [ ] Release tags point to one scanned and signed image digest.
- [ ] The README quick start succeeds from a clean environment.